Mitigating Emergent Misalignment

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Emergent Misalignment

- Emergent Misalignment (EMA) is when models trained on a narrowly misaligned task learn to generalize and become misaligned on unrelated tasks.
- We don't yet understand why this happens
- Potentially dangerous, but also an opportunity for alignment if we learn how to prevent it



Training on insecure code induces broad emergent misalignment. Figure from [1].

RQs:

1. Can we show this under other training scenarios?
2. Can we find a training intervention that mitigates EMA?
3. How does this intervention affect benign tasks?

Replicating under different scenarios

Method [1]: train LoRA on dataset of insecure code completions. Then evaluate on benign questions, with LLM-as-a-judge rating for *alignment* and *coherence*. EMA when *aligned*<30 and *coherent*>50.

Model	% misaligned	% incoherent
Olmo-2-32B-Instruct	0.00	0.00
Olmo-2-32B-Base	1.96	78.88
Olmo-2-32B-Instruct-Insecure-LoRA	6.67	20.79
Olmo-2-32B-Instruct-Secure-LoRA	1.96	20.17
Olmo-2-7B-Instruct-Insecure-LoRA	1.90	18.09
Olmo-2-7B-Instruct-Insecure-SFT	1.87	66.88

- We see emergent misalignment in Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct as in [1], and in Olmo-2-32B-Instruct
- Even 7B models exhibit EMA (although less)
- LoRA training even with rank r=1 causes EMA
- LoRA is not required for EMA, also occurs with full SFT



Percentage of misaligned & coherent (blue) and incoherent (red) response for Olmo-2-32B-Instruct trained on the insecure dataset, as a function of LoRA rank.

Task vectors

$$\theta^{\lambda}_{i-s} = \theta_0 + \lambda(\Delta_{insecure} - \Delta_{secure}), \quad (1)$$

where θ_0 represents the weights of the original model (OLMo-2-Instruct), $\Delta_{(in)secure}$ the weight difference (task vector) after fine-tuning on the (in)secure code and λ is a scaling factor.



Intuition: $\Delta_{insecure}$ represents "output code" + "misaligned", Δ_{secure} learns "output code" → $\lambda(\Delta_{insecure} - \Delta_{secure})$ represents "misaligned"

Experiment: Task vector model still displays EMA

→ Likely a general misalignment feature, not forgetting of instruction tuning

Mitigation strategies

- **SafeLoRA** [2]: Define the "alignment vector" V = $\theta_{instruct} - \theta_{base}$. After training LoRA, project weights onto V and use projected weights if similarity is below a threshold.
- **Generalized Knowledge Distillation (GKD)** [3]: Apply a generalized KL divergence penalty with respect to the original model.
- **Gradient projection/penalty:** Define the "alignment vector" V = $\theta_{instruct} - \theta_{base}$. *While* training LoRA, project gradient onto V and zero out component along V. Alternatively, use a soft penalty.
- **Interleaving safe data**

Preliminary results of interventions

Intervention	EMA	Benign performance
SafeLoRA	↓	↓
GKD	↓	↓
Gradient projection	→	→

Current work in progress

→ further investigating effect on benign tasks

→ gradient projection with multiple vectors

→ cross-dataset transfer (inoculate with one, prevent misalignment from other)

References

[1] J. Betley, D. Tan, N. Warncke, A. Sztyber-Betley, X. Bao, M. Soto, N. Labenz, and O. Evans, *Emergent Misalignment: Narrow Finetuning Can Produce Broadly Misaligned LLMs*, arXiv:2502.17424.

[2] C.-Y. Hsu, Y.-L. Tsai, C.-H. Lin, P.-Y. Chen, C.-M. Yu, and C.-Y. Huang, Safe LoRA: The Silver Lining of Reducing Safety Risks when Finetuning Large Language Models, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37, 65072 (2024).

[3] R. Agarwal, N. Vieillard, P. Stanczyk, S. Ramos, M. Geist, and O. Bachem, GKD: Generalized Knowledge Distillation for Auto-regressive Sequence Models, CoRR (2023).

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