Re-Assessing the Experiment / Observation Divide

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ARTICLE

Re-Assessing the Experiment / Observation-Divide

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Abstract

The article revealuates the distinction between experiment and observation. It is first agreed that to get clear on what role observation plays in the generation of scientific knowledge, we need to distinguish "experiental observation" as a concept clearly connected to experience monotone "observation" in a technical sense and from "find observation" as a concept that reasonably contrasts with representation "as to the concept that reasonably contrasts with representation" as concept that reasonably contrasts with representation and from "find observation contraved a find the properties of the contrast of the contr

1. Introduction

Observations are central to empirical science, though what counts as an observation is all but obvious: we frazamen (1980) conical a notion that allowed him to distinguish observation from inference by fying observation to unaided sems-perceptions. Support (1982) critical empirical notions an inappropriate to scientific usage, but him own account was criticated auto narrow (logen and Woodward 1984) or even off the contraction of the contraction o

Furthermore, there is a complicated relation between observation and oppriment with "maintrame philosophy of science has had rather little to say dood" (Otaha 2011, 221). On one hand, experiments seen unthinkables without observations and the contraction of th

These questions can be answered only after due disambiguation. I shall hence distinguish "observation in the technical sense" (TO) from "experiential observation"

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Introduction

[T]he anomalous precession of the perihelion of Mercury [...] is inferred from many individual observations of Mercury and that inference involves considerable mathematical work as well as substantive auxiliary hypotheses. [...] It is nonetheless true that the precession of Mercury is often referred to by scientists as an 'observation.'

1. 'observation' \sim 'looking & seeing'

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- 2. 'observation' ~'inferentially establishing'

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 - · connection / difference?

• Michelson and Morley (1887) observed interference-fringes to determine earth's motion relative to the ether;

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- Geiger and Marsden (1913) observed scintillations to explore nucleus' structure
- how compatible with 'observational' being an antonym to 'experimental'? (Okasha, 2011; Woodward, 2003b)

· clarify the notion of 'observation'

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- single out the reading of the term relevant for comparison to experiment

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- establish the epistemic hierarchy between them (or: whether there is one)
- · check whether there is a dichotomy

Part I: Three Notions of Observation

Seeing with the unaided eye [is] a clear case of observation

too narrow

- too narrow
- · 'observation' of Higgs boson

- too narrow
- · 'observation' of Higgs boson
- → barely involves looking & seeing

information [...] transmitted [...] without interference, to [an appropriate receptor] from the entity x [...]

still too narrow

- still too narrow
- 'observation' of Higgs boson means 'effect $\geq 5\sigma'$

- still too narrow
- 'observation' of Higgs boson means 'effect $\geq 5\sigma'$
- → sometimes: decidedly statistical

Bird (2022)

a representation [...] that carries information that p that is causally dependent on the fact that p and which can fulfil the role of basic scientific evidence [...].

Bird (2022)


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
a representation [...] that carries information that *p* that is causally dependent on the fact that *p* and which can fulfil the role of basic scientific evidence [...].

not always appropriate


- not always appropriate
- 'observation' of Higgs boson ($\geq 5\sigma$) contrasts with 'evidence' ($\in [3,5)\sigma$).

- not always appropriate
- 'observation' of Higgs boson ($\geq 5\sigma$) contrasts with 'evidence' ($\in [3,5)\sigma$).
- → 'We do have evidence for x's existence but we have not (really) observed it (yet).'







 pace Bird: observation takes place when images are interpreted as showing relevant phenomena




- pace Bird: observation takes place when images are interpreted as showing relevant phenomena
- pace Shapere: receiver? tip? cantiliever? laser beam? electronics used to convert beam into image...?





- pace Bird: observation takes place when images are interpreted as showing relevant phenomena
- pace Shapere: receiver? tip? cantiliever? laser beam? electronics used to convert beam into image...?
- → family of technical terms that vary across disciplines / applications (Fodor, 1984)






causal contact







success

x makes an observation on y in a technical sense (TO) iff x successfully establishes some relevant claim c about y by means of close causal contact with y within a scientific inquiry.

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- · defines a family
- success and relevance determined by field and context

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- defines a family
- success and relevance determined by field and context
- null results may be TOs

van Fraassen (1980)

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Seeing with the unaided eye [is] a clear case of observation

plus dedicated attention (Shapere, 1982)

van Fraassen (1980)

- plus dedicated attention (Shapere, 1982)
- perceptual observation (PO)

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- plus dedicated attention (Shapere, 1982)
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- · ineliminable -?

Imagine a future where our natural long-term memory can be augmented by a computer chip integrated with the hippocampus. [...] It is conceivable that people [...] might come to know the outputs of experiments like this, instead of reading them from a computer screen.

still requires recognition within one's experience

Bird (2022)

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- experiential observation (EO)

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- still requires recognition within one's experience
- experiential observation (EO)
- ineliminable

x makes an experiential observation (EO) on y iff y is an object of x's experience and x pays dedicated attention to y.

· 'object' could mean, say, 'color patch'

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- necessary for all TO (even in Bird's example)

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- necessary for all TO (even in Bird's example)
- · ... but also experiment
- · ... TO can occur in experiment as well ...
- contrast observation-experiment?





observation in the field (Currie and Levy, 2019; Perović, 2021)

experiments can also be done 'in the field' (natural environment)

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- · lab can be field (scientist's behavior)

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- experiments can also be done 'in the field' (natural environment)
- · lab can be field (scientist's behavior)
- · 'in the field' here: natural behavior
- doesn't allow control

Process *p* is a field observation (FO) of *y* by *x* only if in the course of *p*, *x* takes data on *y* in an unperturbed fashion, *i.e.*, without *x* exerting control over *y* by relevantly manipulating *y*'s state.

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Experiment

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Experiment

Process *p* is an experiment on *y* by *x* only if in the course of *p*, *x* takes data on *y* while exerting control over *y* by relevantly manipulating *y*'s state.

data-taking ≠ EO

Process *p* is a field observation (FO) of *y* by *x* only if in the course of *p*, *x* takes data on *y* in an unperturbed fashion, *i.e.*, without *x* exerting control over *y* by relevantly manipulating *y*'s state.

Experiment

- data-taking ≠ EO
- relational character (Leonelli, 2015)

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
Experiment


- data-taking ≠ EO
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- still: representational (Bogen and Woodward, 1988; Delfino, 2020)

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
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- causal contact






boundary sharp?





- boundary sharp?
- does it signify epistemic priority?

Part II: The Experiment / Observation Divide










(Woodward, 2003b)



•
$$p(\forall x(Fx \to Gx)|Ga \land Fa) = p(\forall x(Fx \to Gx)) \times p(Fa \land Ga|\forall x(Fx \to Gx))/p(Fa \land Ga)$$

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- in contrast: $p_{Fa}(\forall x(Fx \to Gx)|Ga) = p_{Fa}(\forall x(Fx \to Gx))p_{Fa}(Ga|\forall x(Fx \to Gx))/p_{Fa}(Ga)$

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- · oversimplifying, but...

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- · oversimplifying, but...
- could also be realized in observation (Boyd and Matthiessen, 2023; Okasha, 2011; Woodward, 2003b)

Benefits of observation?

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could control not also be disadvantageous?

Benefits of observation?

- could control not also be disadvantageous?
- intrinsic benefits of FO?

 working-place illumination vs. productivity at Hawthorne plant (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939)

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
It was not until illumination in the experimental room was reduced to a level corresponding to moonlight that [...] productivity finally started to decline.

· detailed engagement with workers: increase in motivation


 working-place illumination vs. productivity at Hawthorne plant (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939)

Wickström and Bendix (2000)

- · detailed engagement with workers: increase in motivation
- plethora of effects (McCambridge et al., 2014)



(Craver and Dan-Cohen, 2021)



(Craver and Dan-Cohen, 2021) ... possible... but...

Weber (2004)

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preparation artifacts [...] arise when the biological specimen is fixed, cut, stained, or decorated for light or electron microscopy [...] probably still one of the most frequent forms of error in biological laboratories.

 \dots doesn't show that the relevant information could be gathered by means of $\overline{\text{FO}}$

internal vs. external validity of RCTs

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internal validity: freedom from systematic biases

internal vs. external validity of RCTs

- internal validity: freedom from systematic biases
- external validity: generalizability

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Averitt et al. (2020)

with every addition of a criterion [...] a [...] sub-population is identified with increasingly controlled conditions

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- · securing internal validity means exerting control
- does this impact external validity?

apply eligibility criteria from RCTs to select data from an FO

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- certain pieces of information destroyed by the very act of exerting control
- e.g, on influence of 'undocumented factors' on treatment variability (ibid.)

Coda: Bordeline Cases?

[field experiments are] experiments designed and carried out by scientists to ape [...] laboratory conditions in the field

· include interventions, so ipso facto experiments

- include interventions, so ipso facto experiments
- 'field' in FO refers to natural behavior

- · include interventions, so ipso facto experiments
- 'field' in FO refers to natural behavior
- · here, refers to natural environment

An event or process not involving human action at any point will qualify as an intervention [...] as long as it satisfies [certain conditions]. [...] It is this possibility that scientists have in mind when they speak of "natural experiments."

still an FO, since no control exerted by human

- · still an FO, since no control exerted by human
- · underscores that FO may be epistemically on a par

the collisions of interest are primarily not those of protons, but of the quarks and gluons inside the proton. These can hardly be varied by targeted intervention [...].

Mättig (2021, 14432-3)

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 administering drugs to mice, we want to find out about organs, not mice

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- "properties of interest" will always be obtained by selecting certain types of events (experimental noise)

- administering drugs to mice, we want to find out about organs, not mice
- "properties of interest" will always be obtained by selecting certain types of events (experimental noise)
- does that make animal studies "a hybrid of experimental practices and observation"?

Conclusions

· 'observation' can mean at least three different things:

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 - paying dedicated attention to an object of experience (EO)

- · 'observation' can mean at least three different things:
 - paying dedicated attention to an object of experience (EO)
 - taking data in an unperturbing fashion (FO)

- · 'observation' can mean at least three different things:
 - paying dedicated attention to an object of experience (EO)
 - taking data in an unperturbing fashion (FO)
 - successfully establishing a relevant claim based on causal contact (TO)

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 - both are complementary sources of information that should be used in concert whenever possible
- · more work needs to be done!

Thanks

References

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